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Abstract. In order to provide a grounded argument, the present paper asks the following 
questions. Why do States acquire nuclear weapons? Why do finally States tend to prevent this 
acquisition? What does the use of force imply? This logical structure adduces the argument 
sustaining  the  avoidance  of  the  use  of  force  as  a  viable  preventive  tool.  It  concentrates 
exclusively  on  States  instituting  a  threat  and  on  the  force-led  circumventive  strategies’ 
implications used by non-threatening States to prevent acquisition. Through first, stressing the 
security model it emphasise the security-stability reasons for which countries are willing to 
acquire the nuclear weapon. However, secondly it punctuates the tangible side effects faced 
by this model. Therefore, it highlights the move towards the vicious-circle logic. Owing this 
vicious-circle logic, prevention must be advocated. Nonetheless, the third part evidences, via 
the building of my inferential model (confere Figure 1, p.8), the fact that any prevention based 
on the use of force must be refrained on account of its consequences - it nourishes the vicious-
circle logic.  
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Introduction 
 




th of April 2006, in an official statement, the President of the United States of 
America, G. Bush stated that “all options are on table for preventing dangerous States from 
acquiring nuclear weapons”. Among these options, the use of smaller-yield nuclear weapons 
constituting an integral part of the USA airstrikes, developed by the Pentagon in early 2006, 
were  included.  Two  corollaries  follow.  First,  the  need  for  a  selective  prevention 
implementation  -  only  States  representing  a  potential  or  effective  threat  for  national  or 
international security. Second, the need of these options to be essentially force-led - e.g.: 
military pre-emptive or preventive interventions.  
Nuclear weapons are viewed by optimists (Waltz, 1981) as being profitable for the 
international arena, since they allow the enactment of an effective deterrence. Hence they 
sustain the adoption by new States. A contrario, pessimists (Sagan, 1996) consider nuclear 
weapons  as  presenting  an  unequalable  threat,  since  actors  are  unable  to  master  them 
effectively and due to the arising security-dilemma, and urge for the prevention of further 
acquisitions.  Now,  since  the  pessimistic  view  seems  more  plausible,  or  at  least  more 
reasonable, should the prevention involve the use of force? A part of the current literature 
focuses on the side effects of using force (Malin, 2010) and on the unethical dimension (Okin, 
1983) of such a prevention.  
However, the psychological and symbolic dimensions of the use of force are quasi 
derelicted  in  the  current  literature.  This  article  argues  that  the  use  of  force  cannot  be 
dissasociated from its symbolic and psychological impact on the subject - e.g.: ubi maior, 
minor  cesseat.  This  argument  is  build  on  my  inferential  model  (confere  Figure  1,  p.8) 
containing  five  variables  -  use  of  force,  rogue  and  unstable  States,  head  of  State,  pride 
constitutive of Human nature, pride constitutive of State. This construction helps to claim that 
the transmutation of one agent’s principal psychological characteristics - pride sentiment - to 
the scale of an entire State - only possible for non-democratic States - highlights the reasons 
for which the use of violence in the prevention process must be avoided.  
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Why do States acquire nuclear weapons? (Or the security model as a 
support for the acquisition) 
 
“Provide the bomb   it will remove a great danger from us.”  
Joseph Stalin 
 
The security model sees the spread of nuclear weapons as constituting a stabilizer. The 
international anarchic system is replaced by a world nuclear authority having the capacity of 
deterring  its  adversaries.  Since  nuclear  weapons  are  believed  as  having  no  war-winning 
ability, they are only fulfilling rational functions in deterrence, by providing its possessors 
with  a  “minimum  deterrence”  (Waltz,  1990).  Nuclear  deterrence  is  grounded  in  the 
mathematical  game-theoretic  models  of  rational  interaction.  Nuclear  weapons  transform 
concepts of deterrence and war fighting in military strategies. The perspective of the use of 
nuclear weapons constitutes a Sword of Damocles refraining actors from their aggressive 
actions, through the perspective of inflicting irremediable damages with a retaliatory nuclear 
contend. The logic of nuclear deterrence is based on the prospective of fear: it works because 
it  is  based  on  fear  (Waltz,  1990).  Even  irrational  leaders  are  likely  to  recognize  the 
exceedingly high costs of a nuclear war hence, the “probability of major war among States 
having  nuclear  weapons  approaches  zero”  (Waltz,  1990).  Asal  and  Beandskey  (2007) 
examined the relationship between the severities of violence in crises and the number of 
involved States with nuclear weapons. Their study is based on the ICB data set between 1918 
and 2001, and shows that nuclear weapons decrease the level of violence in a crisis. Owing 
that “world politics occur in shadow of force” (Clausewitz, 1976), the prospect of military 
violence generates influence which often obviates the need to fight. The imminent risk of 
nuclear war tends to deter conventional forms of international violence, given the risk of 
escalation  faced  by  nuclear  powers.  For  instance,  the  Kargil  conflict  in  1999,  nuclear 
deterrence delimited Indo-Pakistanis conflict. The security model is hence, grounded on semi-
equilibrium of the balance of power, in which one actor adjusts its behaviour in response to 
the nuclear capability shock, while the other actor does not adjust.  
The possession of nuclear weapons enhances the security - engaging in conflict with 
non-nuclear  opponents  without  the  fear  that  the  opponent  will  challenge  the  fundamental 
interests - and the diplomatic power of the possessors. Possessors tend to emerge victorious 
from conflicts (e.g.: Second World War). Similarly, it influences allocation of resources and   4 
bargains in favour of nuclear powers (Gartzke and Jo, 2007), as it is used strategically to 
gamer international influence. Examining variables from the Issue Correlates of War Dataset, 
Gartzke and Jo found that States with nuclear weapons tend to resolve ongoing territorial, 
maritime and riparian issues more quickly, peacefully, and favourably. “To the extent that the 
military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower 
levels of violence” (Geller, 1990). Nuclear weapons do not affect the frequency of conflict, 
but they do affect the timing, intensity and outcome of conflict. Nuclear weapons tend to shift 
intensity of disputes toward lower end of conflict scale. 
However,  the  security  model  is  too  optimistic  and  ignores  the  psychological  and 
informational aspects of proliferation. For instance, the relative nuclear stability between the 
US, NATO allies and Russia is due to the commonality of culture and historical experience. 
Furthermore, the security model also ignores the need of the country and of the global arena 
to attain a level of acclimatising with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons “whoever 
gets the nuclear weapon behaves with caution and moderation […] over a period of more than 
fifty years” (Waltz, 1990).  
 
 
Why do States tend to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons? 
(Or the move from the security model to the vicious circle logic) 
 
“In order to protect us against a sword, we need a shield. Yet, the building of a shield for 
protecting us against nuclear weapons revealed itself to be impossible.” 
 Jacques Attali 
 
In 2007 Annual Report to Congress on the projected threats to the National Security of 
US,  the  Director  of  the  National  Intelligence,  M.  McConnell,  concluded  that  nuclear 
proliferation  poses  one  of  the  greatest  threats  to  US  national  security.  Does  it  signal  an 
involuntary disconnection from the security model and a move towards the “proliferation 
begets proliferation” (Schultz, 1984) logic?  
In Atomic Power and World Order, Brodie argued that there could be no defence 
against nuclear weapons and that States could guard against nuclear attack only if they had the 
ability  to  retaliate  in  kind.  Such  an  argument  clearly  evidences  the  consequent  security-
dilemma  and  the  vicious-circle  logic  of  the  acquisition.  The  stability-instability  paradox   5 
highlights  that  the  possession  of  nuclear  weapons  by  one  State  generates  more  local 
aggressions and small conflicts, contributing to the rise of a “spate of smaller wars” (Waltz, 
1981). However, the probability of crisis initiation between two States will increase if both 
possess nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996). The deriving strategies of brinkmanship - challenging 
altering status quo - emphases the fact that the risk of war is contingent on what is being 
demanded by both sides. For example, Asia and the Middle-East constitute geo-strategic parts 
composed  by  States  with  nuclear  forces  and  on  the  way  towards  a  nuclear  acquisition 
programme - but having variable degrees of operational experience and in the propensity to 
achieve goals via the use of power. The spread of nuclear-capable delivery systems in these 
regions  is  especially  dangerous  because  plausible  adversaries  live  close  together  and  are 
already  engaged  in  territorial  and  religious  disputes.  Furthermore,  the  increasing 
nuclearization process of these regions, shifts geopolitics of mass destruction from European 
centre of gravity - controlled - to Asian and Middle Eastern centre of gravity - more inclined 
to lead to war outbreaks (Bracken, 1999).  
Additionally, the respective episodes of the Cuban missile crisis 1961 and the Able 
Archer crisis of 1983 highlight that possessing nuclear weapons cannot refrain leaders from 
mistrust, misperceptions, miscalculations, because there is “little room for trust among States” 
(Clausewitz, 1967). During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy announced publicly 
that  the  USA  would  regard  any  nuclear  attacks  from  Cuba  on  the  USA  or  elsewhere  in 
Western hemisphere as the equivalent to a soviet attack on the USA, guaranteeing retaliatory 
response.  
Intrinsic problems with command and control in nuclear war made deterrence highly 
risky, shifting towards the will to institute de-alerting strategies (Shell, 1998). “The common 
enemy of mankind was the bomb as widely-held weapon; the common interest of mankind 
and of the nations too, was to get that weapon under control” (Bundy, 1988). Inadvertent 
nuclear war is the result of unanticipated combination of human and technical factors, pulling 
inexorably both parties in a nuclear crisis despite shared interest in avoiding war. In inadvertent 
nuclear cases, the potential targeted State, must infer other side’s intention from the disposition of 
its forces, from the behaviour of its command, control and communications. In 1995, during the 
launch of Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying aurora borealis, the initial 
phase  resembled  to  a  ballistic  missile  possible  headed  for  Russian  territory.  Without  the 
intelligence offices’ efforts of Russia, this rocket launch could have generated a nuclear war. 
The effects of nuclear weapons are thus unpredictable and go beyond immediate space of 
application and concern: further insecurity, further proliferation etc…   6 
What  are  the  consequences  of  the  use  of  force  in  the  prevention 
process? (Or the use of force as a support of the vicious circle logic) 
 
“The direct use of force is such a poor solution to any problem   it is generally employed only 
by small children and large nations.” 
 David Friedman 
 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report for the prevention of nuclear 
weapons acquisition stated that “If you're really worried that terrorists are going to get nuclear 
materials and build a bomb, then we have to be acting a lot more aggressively and thinking 
more comprehensively to lock down the global nuclear complex”. Accordingly, the use of 
force is arrogated because of the menace that some States constitute for the global security. 
States constituting potential threats are Rogue States and unstable nations. According to the 
American Pentagon, America’s [and the world] security are less threatened by “conquering 
States than by failed and failing ones”. Among these categories, the principal targets are the 
countries suspected of developing a nuclear programme: North Korea, Iran, Syria, Morocco, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Despite this, on what grounds can a State or a community of States 
impose a prohibition on the basis of force? The use of force - having as classical form of 
expression the war - as a tool for prevention, can be legitimate only if it takes place within the 
concept of jus ad bellum. A war perpetrated for the just cause, falling under the category of an 
answer  to  “a  wrong  received”  in  Vitoria’s  terminology.  Only  an  effective  implemented 
democratic regime can conduct a just war, since only legitimate governments have rights. 
Moreover, a just war must comply with requirements of the international legal infrastructure. 
Hence, any decision of use of force must be ratified by the United Nations’ Security Council.  
Ergo, among the tools involving force that a States has, pre-emptive and preventive 
wars - both are defensive strategies with offensive means – are incorporated. Pre-emptive 
wars  are  administrated  within  a  time-urgent  context:  the  opponent’s  attack  is  therefore 
imminent. As regards to preventive wars, they are launched to preclude growing power on 
future  capability  of  an  enemy  who  might  plausibly  attack.  Therefore,  the  utility  of  pre-
emptive war is based on the benefits of being the attacker instead of the defender, while the 
utility of preventive war is motivated by the desire to fight sooner than later. Most national 
security  statements  of  the  USA  since  9/11  are  characterized  by  the  use  of  pre-emptive 
warfare. For instance, the Operation Iraqi Freedom was listed by the Bush administration as a   7 
pre-emptive  war  (risk  of  Iraqi  use  of  Mass  Destruction  Weapons).  Withal,  scholars  have 
classified it as preventive.  
The strategic rationality of the use of force is based on the Clausewitzian paradigm of 
war. It corresponds to a system of instrumental and utilitarian reason that considers force - 
even nuclear – as mean for the achievement of national political ends, bringing war itself 
under the control and restraint of the political sphere. This States a rationalistic assumption 
that well-planned and executed uses of force achieve a clear transmutations of military means 
into  political  ends  by  conquering  the  rival’s  will.  However,  this  must  be  achieved  at  an 
acceptable  cost  beyond  which  the  object  must  be  given  up.  This  strategic  rationality 
comprehends a capital bémol. It identifies an instrumental reason that pairs the wrong telos 
and  the  wrong  mean  (military  mean  for  rational  policy  end).  The  nuclear  mean  is  too 
destructive while the end must be the global and human security. Furthermore, pre-emptive 
wars are provocative and the reaction of the enemy can never be entirely predicted due to the 
interference of contingencies and psychological attributes.  
  The use of force for achieving the prohibition is the hic jacet lupus for the global 
security. The inferential model that I developed (confere Figure 1, p.8) corresponds to the idea 
that because the potential States constituting a  threat are non-democratic, their respective 
powers  are  concentrated  within  the  hands  of  their  head  of  State.  Pride  and  subsequently 
honour are inherent and constitutive psychological characteristics of the Human being. In our 
present case, due to the concentrated and centralized power, States are assimilable to their 
head. Therefore, using force in order to prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons, leads to 
the  reversed  effects  of  those  anticipated.  Passions  are  studied  in  their  connection  to  the 
motivation which can lead to positive or negative effects. The emotive origin in conjunction 
to  the  circumstances  determines  behaviours  and  actions.  In  our  case  the  emotive  shutter 
release is identified as the State’s hammered pride, “in general, pride is at the bottom of all 
great mistakes” (Ruskin, 2000).    8 
                   
 
The inferential model (Figure 1) 
 
 
The act of hindering a State the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, via the use 
of force due to its symbolism (e.g.: cardinal value) prejudices its pride and its subsequent 
honour.  It  corresponds  to  treat  this  State  as  a  child,  an  entity  cognitively  and  morally 
underdeveloped.  This  implies  the  absence  of  effective  and  formalized  recognition  of  the 
State’s legitimacy in the international sphere. Paradoxically, this hindering also marks the 
recognition of the force and of the potential danger that this State represents if supplied with 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, the use of force involves either the idea of the failure or the absence 
of other means, and thus corresponds to a last resort tool. This specificity empowers the 
enemy  since  it  inducts  in  its  mind  the  idea  of  its  importance.  This  relation  of  negation-
affirmation conducts towards the enforcement of the State’s desire to acquire the nuclear 
weapon. For instance, if the United States would decide to bombard Iran’s nuclear sites, the 
Islamic regime, in a crisis of legitimacy, would transform this situation in a positive one by 
highlighting the hammered pride and would nourish an incentive nationalistic strategy leading 
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to  the  acquisition.  The  forced  interference  marks  the  symbolism  of  an  authoritarian 
paternalism grounded in a moral and developmental superiority. Besides, it also signals the 
hegemony of the civilized Western and of the world culture, of the alpha States. In The 
 icomachean Ethics, Aristotle highlights that Human beings try to give the evil via the evil 
otherwise they consider themselves as being reduced to the grade of slaves. Because both 
pride and honour of an agent assert publicly the capacity to defend and to control, when these 
are  hammered,  the  agent  seeks  revenge.  Thus,  revenge  which  is  the  consequence  of  a 
hammered pride and of a subordinated national honour is the direct reaction to a noxious 
action. In Essays Civil and Moral; and, the  ew Atlantis, Bacon calls the passion of revenge 
the wild justice and insists on its antisocial and destructive character. By using an identical 
argumentative  structure,  it  results  that  any  action  involving  the  use  of  force  in  order  to 
compel, does also present the above mentioned consequences.  
In our case, the first category of States among which force would be used in order to 
prevent  the  nuclear  weapon’s  acquisition  are  rogue  States,  vilipended  because  of  their 
constant use of force. This force response to a force message is entering into the vicious-circle 
logic. To use Schultz’s syntaxical structure, it can be said that “violence begets violence”. For 
example, when you attack a Rottweiler there is no place for uncertainty with regard to its 
response to your aggression, this situation is paralleled at the level of States. Congruently, in 
February 2010, current President of Iran, M. Ahmadinejad warned the Great powers, that they 
will regret if they decide to adopt sanctions. If this is valid for formal sanctions, it would be 
even  more  valid  for  force-involving  sanctions.  Furthermore,  “wars  have  unexpected 
consequences for the winners, by making them prisoners of unsuspected political troubles 
(e.g.:  intervention  in  Iraq)”  (Layne,  1991).  The  first  USA  war  in  Iraq,  in  1991,  was  a 
conventional attack on a defender nuclear capable (Iraq was fought so). This attack led to the 
emergence of  Iran  as the regional power and subjected  Iraq to centrifugal forces, having 
favoured the civil war and having laid the grounds for the next US military intervention (in 
2003).  The  second  category  comprises  States  that  are  unstable  and  labile.  Here,  the  pre-
emptive  or  preventive  intervention  is  either  vain  or  involves  side-effects.  Even  if  the 
intervention succeeds military, it will have no effect on the political regime of the targeted 
nation. Force interventions are not acting upon the structure, upon the cause. Furthermore, 
using force against a labile State, will lead to further instability and consequent uncertainty 
about its future actions.  
Moreover, the use of force creates a unity among the enemy’s societal forces and 
creates the empathy and sympathy of the neighbourhood or of the States’ allies. The war in   10 
Vietnam enabled the “Vietcong to acquire additional recruits and weapons” (Morgenthau, 
1965).  Particularly  Asia  and  Middle-East  (regions  considered  as  potential  threats)  are 
characterized  by  having  we self  cultures.  This  implicates  that  once  the  pride  and  honour 
assailed, a social unity will occur, generating an infra-State or even inter-State will to defeat 
the enemy’s ends (here the prevention). As an illustration, the strategic alliance Iran-Syria can 
be mentioned. With a high degree of probability, if one of these countries would be impeded 
by force from acquiring nuclear weapons, it would release a “fraternal” answer from its allied. 
Owing all these consequences, derived from the inferential model, the use of force in order to 
achieve  the  prevention  must  be  avoided,  since  the  risk  is  too  high.  “To  love  means  to 
renounce to the use of force” (Kundera, 1989), persistently, to respect other States and the 
Human kind [via assessing the consequences of force-led preventions] means to renounce to 





  This  article  has  constructed  an  argument  for  why  force  should  be  avoided  as  a 
prohibition toll against the acquisition process. It should be avoided on the account that is 
entertains the vicious-circle logic because of its conjunction to the subject’s pride and honour 
and the marking of a developmental superiority. Therefore, a viable solution with regard to 
the prevention would be the implementation of a horizontal strategy. The aim would be to 
palliate to, and to abolish the symbolic of the Western superiority, since it is necessary to exit 
the good States, bad States dialectic. Moreover, such a preventive model necessitates a real 
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